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Abstract 
The paper develops a two-country endogenous growth model to 
investigate possible causes for the existence and persistence of 
productivity growth differentials between nations despite a common 
technology, constant returns to scale and perfect international capital 
mobility. Private consumption is derived from a three-period overlapping 
generations specification. 
The source of productivity (growth) differentials in our model is the 
existence of a non-traded capital good ('human capital') whose 
augmentation requires a non-traded current input (time spent by the young 
in education rather than leisure). 
We consider the influence on productivity growth differentials of 
private thrift, public debt, the taxation of capital and savings and of 
policy towards human capital formation. 
KEY WORDS: Endogenous Growth, Convergence, Capital Mobility, Non-Traded Goods 
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(1) INTRODUCTION. 
This paper develops a simple two-country growth model to investigate 
possible causes for the existence and persistence of differences in average 
labor productivity! between countries and regions despite a common global 
technology, non-increasing returns to scale and unrestricted international 
mobility of financial capital. The model can either be viewed as an 
endogenous growth version of the two-country overlapping generations (OLG) 
neoclassical growth model of Buiter [1981, 1989], Frenkel and Razin [1987], 
and Buiter and Kletzer [1990a,b] 2, or as a two-country, OLG 3, constant 
returns to scale version of one of the models belonging to the class discussed 
1n Lucas [1988]. 
Our choice of an OLG consumption structure is motivated by our desire to 
include deficit financing and intergenerational redistribution among the 
fiscal policies we analyze. Our OLG consumption structure implies that there 
is no first-order debt neutrality. Government borrowing with debt service 
financed through taxes on the younger generations will therefore tend to crowd 
out domestic saving. In our model it will also be shown to influence domestic 
human capital formation, although generally in the opposite direction from its 
effect on saving. The OLG structure also permits one to consider the 
implications of constant but internationally different time preference rates, 
without this inevitably implying asymptotic ownership of all global financial 
wealth by the residents of a single country. Alogoskoufis and van der Ploeg 
(1991], independently developed a two-country endogenous growth OLG model with 
perfect international capital mobility. 
Even with a balanced budget the government can influence domestic 
physical capital formation directly by varying the marginal tax rates on the 
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capital income of firms. To the extent that this influences the interest 
rate, such policies will also indirectly influence household saving and human 
capital formation. The government can also influence the domestic 
accumulation of human capital directly (and with a balanced budget) by varying 
the marginal tax rate on non-human asset income earned by households4~ 
Many current models investigate differences in long-run economic 
performance between national economies. In much of the endogenous growth 
literature the same technology (generally summarized 1n a production function) 
is assumed to be available to each national economy. With the exception of 
Alogoskoufis and van der Ploeg, who assume perfect international financial 
capital mobility, that part of the endogenous growth literature that 
explicitly models a multi-country world assumes complete financial autarky: no 
international lending and borrowing (or direct international investment) 
occur. In addition, labor (and population in its other aspects, that of 
consumers and portfolio holders) is also assumed to be internationally 
immobile 56. We maintain the assumption of immobile labor in our model. With· 
financial autarky, differences in national saving rates will be translated 
into long-run differences in national productivity levels for exogenous growth 
models and into differences in national productivity levels and growth rates for 
endogenous growth models. 
The recent literature on international trade and growth considers cases 
in which there may or may not be direct technology transfer (instantaneous or 
gradual) and trade in intermediate inputs 7 • 
The technological assumptions made in this paper (constant returns to 
reproducible factors) permit "endogenous growth". The key points of the paper 
would, however, hold true even if the global technology only permitted 
exogenous (long-run) growth as is the case in much of the growth theory of the 
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fifties and sixties (see e.g. Solow [1956, 1970]). In that case (long-run) 
equalization of productivity growth rates would be assured automatically, and 
the "bite" of the assumptions of a shared global technology and perfect 
financial capital mobility would be in the prediction of convergence of kvels 
of output per worker. 
Under the assumptions of free international technology transfer, free 
international financial capital mobility and no non-traded productive inputs, 
many of the existing exogenous and endogenous growth models would imply global 
convergence of output per worker 8 • Differences in national savings rates 
would not account for differences in national rates of accumulation of 
augmentable factors. In the simplest version of the model (absent_.adjustment 
costs) convergence would be immediate: any country could import Japanese-style 
levels and growth rates of output per person-hour overnight. The class of 
models to which this global convergence result applies includes all those for 
which the common aggregate national (or regional9) production function 
exhibits constant or decreasing returns10 to internationally mobile factors of 
production 1112. 
Our model is a complete, two-country dynamic general equilibrium model 
which determines (among other things) both the levels and the growth rates of 
output and output per worker in each country. For reasons of space and 
because (with the help of one further assumption) it permits a major reduction 
in the amount of tedious algebra inflicted on the reader, we restrict 
ourselves to the analysis of the determinants of productivity growth differentials 
between the two countries. This is an important subject in its ·own right. 
Can.Japanese-level productivity be imported "off-the-shelf"? 
The prediction that, with a common global technology and free 
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international mobility of financial capital, levels and growth rates of output 
per worker should be equalized across the globe is a source of empirical 
embarrassment. This remains true even if its sharp edges are dulled somewhat 
by allowing for real world restrictions on the international mobility of 
financial capital and for adjustment costs in the accumulation of augmentable 
factors of production. 
It makes no sense to have as one's maintained hypothesis the notion that 
Bolivia or Togo can order to go, off-the~shelf and.overnight (or subject to a 
few years delay to allow for the presence of the familiar strictly convex 
adjustment costs of the neoclassical theory of investment), the highest 
productivity levels of the last decade of the twentieth century, simply by 
opening themselves completely to international financial capital mobility and 
international transfer of technology. There are important "local" or national 
essential complementary inputs into the production process that cannot be 
imported but have to be "home-grown". We are referring to the social, 
political, cultura1-, legal and educational infrastructure without which modes 
of production and economic organization conducive to high productivity cannot 
be realized. 
In our formal model, we try to capture some of the essence of these 
"home-grown" inputs by including in the production function a non-traded 
capital good ("human capital") whose production requires a non-traded current 
input (efficiency units of labor time) that has an alternative use 1n 
consumption as intrinsically valued leisure. The model can easily be extended 
to include a second alternative use for labor time, by allowing current labor 
time to be used in the production of goods other than human capital. This 
second good, which can be consumed privately or publicly or used for physical 
capital accumulation, would be the traded output of our current model. r-
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The notion that the current endowment of labor time can be used either 
for accumulating human capital or for the production of marketable output is a 
standard feature of many endogenous growth models (see e.g. Lucas [1988] and 
Romer [199Oa]). For expository simplicity only, we exclude "raw" labor (in 
our formal model the time endowment of the young generation) from use as an 
input in the current production of the traded good. Only physical (traded) 
capital and human (non-traded) capital (in our formal model the endowment of 
time (in efficiency units) of the middle-aged) are arguments in the production 
function of traded output13. 
Ve realize that our non-traded human capital good whose production 
requires the input of a non-traded, non-produced input that has alternative 
uses as a consumption good (or as both a consumption good and a productive 
input into the production of traded goods), captures but very partially our 
notion of "home-grown" infrastructure. Some elements of the home-grown 
infrastructure (the rule of law, the clear definition and defense of property 
rights, the enforcement of contracts and general popular attitudes towards 
entrepreneurship, business and private profit) are variables with a bounded 
range of variation rather than resembling capital-like inputs whose quantity 
can be varied (given time and effort) without upper bound. 
Other "home-grown" inputs such as a skilled and educated labor force fit 
more easily into our formal straight jacket. It is true that countries can 
send their citizens abroad to advance their education and that the processes 
of education and training within a country can make use of imported inputs. 
This, however is, and has been historically, of second-order importance. In 
our formal model human capital cannot be traded at all, but in one version of 
the model we permit the production of human capital goods to make use of a 
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traded input in addition to non-traded domestic labor time. There is, 
however, imperfect substitutability between the home-grown and the tradable 
inputs to human capital accumulation. Our formal model should, however, be 
viewed only as a first stab at characterizing "difficult" and uneven economic 
growth and development. ~e believe that, when attempting to map.from our 
formal model to the real world, the non-tradedness of human capital and labor 
services should be interpreted as due to more basic factors (technological, 
economic, social, political and cultural) than just restrictive trade 
policies. Models that imply that, but for perverse government policies, 
Japanese levels of productivity could be achieved everywhere within a 
relatively short period of time cannot, in our view, be taken seriously. 
Increasing returns. 
It is extremely simple, analytically, to account for persistent (and even 
widening) differentials in national or regional productivity levels and/or 
growth rates by working with models that exhibit increasing returns to mobile 
factors of production at the level of the national or regional economy. Both 
the command optimum and the competitive equilibrium (if one exists 14) of many 
models with increasing returns to scale will, ~ith international or 
interregional-mobility of non-labor factors of production and immobile labor, 
lead to widening differentials between national levels or growth rates of 
labor productivity. Accumulation and production will often tend to become 
concentrated in the nation or region that started off, through historical 
accident, with the largest scale of production. 
Even in models without persistent endogenous or exogenous growth, 
increasing returns to scale and factor mobility may lead to regional 
(including national) divergence in production patterns (see e.g. the 
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"economies of agglomeration" studied by Arthur [1983, 1988 and 1989] and 
Krugman [1990]). 
In the current paper we assume constant returns to scale and competitive 
output markets, although we intend to investigate in future work the 
consequences of (bounded and unbounded) increasing returns and of 
non-competitive behavior by firms. 
How important are increasing returns to scale? Views on the empirical 
significance of increasing returns (and other sources of non-convexities in 
the production possibility set) seem to move in irregular cycles (see e.g 
Smith [1775, especially the famous Volume 1, Chapter 3], Young [1928], 
Arrow [1962], Kaldor [1966, 1975, 1981] for a range of early formal or 
informal arguments in support of the proposition that increasing returns 
matter for the explanation of aggregate economic growth). 
The issue can of course only be settled empirically. There is no 
evidence we know of that convincingly supports the existence of unbounded 
increasing returns to scale 1s16. · 
Testing empirically for the presence or absence of increasing returns to 
scale is complicated by the absence of any clear consensus on what the 
relevant scale variable is, that is on where the increasing returns are 
located. Some theories seem to locate increasing returns at the level of the 
individual enterprise, establishment or plant. Others suggest industry 
output, often without specifying whether it is the regional, national or 
global industry that matters. Current output and cumulative output have both 
been suggested as scale variables. In Lucas [1988], the aggregate (national?) 
stock of human capital generates the key externality. While externalities and 
increasing returns are in principle quite distinct, in Lucas [1988] the human 
capital externalities do create increasing returns, in the sense that 
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activities which absent the externality would have constant returns to scale, 
experience increasing returns with the externality. A very different picture 
emerges if it is not the total but the average level of human capital that 
generates the externality. The stock or flow of R&D (or of "knowledge") is 
often assumed to generate externalities and increasing returns to scale in 
activities that, absent the externality would have constant returns to scale. 
l&ether this occurs at the level of the industry (national, regional or 
global) or of the global economy as a whole is left open by the theory. 
A recent statement of the view that nonconvexities matter greatly both at 
the level of the individual firm and at the aggregate level is in Paul Romer 
[1990b]. Romer's views on these issues carry weight because of his central 
role in launching the "endogenous growth" research program (see especially 
Romer [1986, 1987]; for further developments see Lucas [1988], 
Romer [1989a,b; 1990a], Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny [1989]). It is therefore 
important to point out that the arguments in Romer [1990b] leading to his 
linking of non-rivalness and increasing returns are based partly on an a-priori 
assertion or postulate, partly on a non-sequitur and partly on interesting and 
suggestive illustrations, but not on systematic empirical investigation. 
The a-priori assertion, which we shall refer to as the "replication 
postulate"; comes 1n the form of the following bold statement: 
"The most basic premise in our scientific reasoning about the 
physical world is that it (is) possible to replicate any sequence of 
events by replicating the relevant initial conditions. (This is 
both a statement of faith and a definition of relevant initial 
conditions)." (Romer [1990b, p. 3]). 
Internally consistent Postulates are neither right nor "'rang. If they 
are to be useful to an empirical science, the primitive terms they contain 
must be interpretable unambiguously in terms of real world counterparts. 
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(This must be where faith comes in). The replication postulate, however, is 
not supplemented with any hints as to what "relevant initial conditions" might 
mean in any empirical scientific application. Until a rule is provided for 
determining and verifying "relevant initial conditions", the replication 
postulate is without empirical content, an empty box.i7 
Romer goes on to fill the empty box with the following assertion: 
"For production theory, this means that it is possible to double the 
output of any production process by doubling all of the rival inputs" 
(Romer [1990b, p. 3]). 
This, of course, is a non-sequitur unless we accept the empirical statement 
that the relevant initial conditions are limited to the rival inputs 18 • No 
arguments are given to support this claim. 
If instead one were to make the (no less plausible) assertion that the 
relevant initial conditions consist of the rival inputs and the nonrival 
inputs, there would be constant returns to rival and non-rival inputs 
combined. 
One could go further and quite plausibly take the rival inputs (or both 
the rival and nonrival inputs combined) together with the moment of their 
application to constitute the relevant initial conditions. In that case there 
cannot be constant returns to rival inputs (or to both rival and nonrival 
inputs combined) if the replication of the rival inputs (or of both the rival 
and nonrival inputs) takes place at a different date from their initial or 
benchmark application: we pass this way but once. 
By far the simplest way of underlining the vacuousness of the replication 
postulate, however, is by permitting scale (of production or of application of 
inputs) to belong to the set of relevant initial conditions. Assume for 
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concreteness that the list of rival and non-rival inputs completes the set of 
relevant initial conditions. Consider two carefully controlled experimental 
settings, A and B. Replication in experimental setting B of the productive 
process in experimental setting A involves applying the same quantities of all 
(rival and non-rival) inputs in the two experimental Settings. Application of 
the replication postulate implies that the same levels of output will be 
produced in both A and B. 
Doubling the quantity of all inputs applied in A (doubling the scale of 
production) and doubling the quantity of all inputs applied in B again results 
(given the replication postulate and our list of relevant initial conditions) 
in equal levels of output in the two experimental settings. Nothing is 
implied, however, about increasing, constant or decreasing returns to scale 
"within" the two settings. The output levels in A and B following the 
doubling of the input levels of all rival and non-rival inputs may have 
doubled, quadrupled, fallen by half or remained constant. 
Like Romer's application of the replication postulate to production 
theory, our last four paragraphs do not contain any serious reference to the 
only kind of evidence that could resolve the returns to scale issue: empirical 
evidence from the physical and bio-rnedical sciences, from production 
engineering, from management science and even from the social sciences on 
indivisibilities and other possible sources of fixed costs. 
Non-rival inputs clearly exist (Starrett's example of information as a 
productive input is an obvious one (Starrett [1988, p. 74])) and may well be 
important empirically, although no systematic evidence has as yet been 
collected. Their existence and significance is a totally separate issue from 
. the existence and significance of increasing returns to scale. 
· ~e conclude this introduction with a brief outline of the rest of the 
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paper. Section 2 develops the model. Section 3 analyzes a very simple 
special case in which human capital accumulation requires no traded inputs. 
Traded inputs into human capital accumulation are added in. Section 4, which 
considers the effects of changes in distortionary tax rates and exhaustive 
public spending. Section 5 studies the effects of deficit financing and 
lump-sum intergenerational redistribution on growth rate differentials.·. 
Section 6 concludes. 
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(2) THE IODEL. 
a. Household behavior. 
The decisions concerning consumption, labor supply, human capital 
formation and financial portfolio allocation are taken by 
households-consumers. The household sector in each country is modeled through 
a three period overlapping generations model. Ve only derive the household 
decision rules for the home country. The corresponding decision rules for the 
* foreign households are obtained attaching the superscript to foreign taste 
parameters and household choice variables. In the first period of its life 
( ' h' ) h .th b . . d h d f . hoyout , t e J consumer orn 1n per10 t as an en owment o time, j t 
when measured in-efficiency units, which she can either choose to c-onsume as 
leisure r\ in period t or to allocate to an alternative use, which we shall 
call education jet This education process during the first period of 
household's life adds to the endowment of labor time in efficiency units 
during the second period ('middle age'), that is during period t+l for a 
household born in period t. 
Vhile young the household can also choose to spend private resources 
other than time on human capital formation. Such private spending on 
education will have to be financed by borrowing, since the household is 
born without financial endowment and does not earn any income in the first 
period of its life. Public spending on the education of household j, jgt 
also boosts jht.1 For simplicity the young are assumed not to pay any taxes 
or to receive any transfer payments other than the benefits from the "transfer 
in kind" jgt' which cannot be resold by the recipient. 
There is a key externality in the process of human capital formation. 
Formally we model this by assuming that jht,0 the amount of time measured in 
efficiency units (henceforth human capital) that the j th household of 
13 
generation t starts off with is given by the average amount of human capital 
achieved by the previous generation during middle age, that is, letting Nt 
denote the number of households-consumers in period t, 
Nt-1
0 1 1 
J.ht = Nt-l ~ iht-1i=l 
Each member of a new generations stands, as regards its starting level of 
human capital (knowledge, education), on the shoulders of the average member 
of the previous generation. Note that }!-l is non-rival with respect to the 
levels of human capital achieved in period t by members of generation t , 
ih~, i = 1, ... , Nt. If generation tis larger (say because of a higher rate 
of population growth), more members of generation twill benefit from the 
higher (average) level of education achieved by the previous generation. We 
· 1 0also assume that the effect of jht-l on iht is non-excludable. Those rn 
generation t who benefit from the knowledge accumulated by generation t-1 
cannot be made to pay for these benefits. Such complete non-excludability will 
almost surely result in Pareto-inefficiency of the unaided competitive 
equilibrium. This human capital accumulation mechanism is an obvious 
extension of the one developed by Lucas [1988], following Uzawa [1965]. Apart 
from our use of an OLG structure instead of Lucas' representative 
infinite-lived agent, our human capital accumulation technology differs by 
permitting the use of purchased produced inputs in addition to time. 
Note that if the OLG structure without voluntary private 
intergenerational transfers were to be replaced by one which permitted an 
operative intergenerational gift and bequest motive, part of the 
intergenerational externality would be internalized. If private 
intergenerational transfers were motivated by concern about the welfare of 
ancestors or descendants (rather than by the joy of giving), each generation 
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would allow for and value appropriately the positive effect of its own 
education expenditures (jet and jmt for household j of generation t) on the 
human capital of its children, grandchildren and subsequent descendants. The 
1beneficial effects of jht-l are however, in our specification, not limited to 
the lineal descendants of household j but are shared by all born in period t 
and later. Unless, through vigorous intermarriage a la Bernheim and 
Bagwell [1988], all of society effectively constitutes one big happy family, 
the human capital formation externality, whose domain is both 
intergenerational and across families or dynasties, will not be fully 
internalized ~ven if one assumed universal operative intergenerational gift 
motives. During the second period (middle age) the only household choice 
1concerns how much to consume, jct. The entire endowment of labor time 
services in efficiency units jhi is supplied inelastically in the labor 
market. 
In the last period of life ('old age' or 'retirement') households do not 
work or educate themselves. The old consume jc~ , which equals the value of 
the resources they carried into old age through saving in the first two period 
of their lives, minus any taxes jr~ paid in their last period. 
Formally, each household j, (j = 1, ... ,Nt) of generation t, (t > 0) 
maximizes the following: 
2 2 1(1) Max .ut = P u(.ct) + Pu(.ct) + v(.ft)1 1 2
{jft, jht' jet, jmt' jct, jct} J J J J 
u(.) and v(.) are increasing, strictly quasi-concave, twice continuously 
differentiable and satisfy the Inada conditions 
lim u(x) = lim v(x) = 1/lim u(x) = 1/lim v(x) = O; P > 0. 




(2) - Ot+l - ~t+l)jmt + jhtwt+1 - jct - j 7t 
> 0 19- [jc~ + jr~](l + rt+2 - Ot+2)-1 
0(3) jit = jht - jet 
Nt-1 
(4) jh~ = N~-1 i~l ih!-1 
1 0 .et .mt .gt
(5) jht = jht [1 + ¢(4,4,S---)J
.ht -ht .ht . J J J 
At the initial date, t = O, we have jh~ > 0. 
In equation (1), Pis the constant one-period subjective discount factor. 
It need not be less than unity. 
Equation 2 is the lifetime budget constraint of member j of generation t. 
wt+l the wage paid per unit of efficiency labor in period t+l. The before tax 
interest factor on loans from period t to period t+1 is 1 + rt+l· Otis the 
period t residence-based tax rate on all non-human asset income 1n the home 
country. It is therefore also the subsidy rate to all domestic borrowing, 
including borrowing by the young. We also wish to consider the subsidization 
of "student loans" (expenditures on human ca.pita.I formation) a.s a. policy 
instrument. ~ is the subsidy rate on these loans. Households.. also pay 
lump-sum taxes when middle aged (jri) and when old (jr~)- These can of course 
be negative. We assume that the authorities do not tax any generation "into 
the ground", that is jr! and jr~ are such that (2) can be satisfied for 
1 2
positive values of jct, jct and jmt. 
¢(.,.,.), the (proportional) return function for the household's human 
capital formation process, is increasing in its three arguments, strictly 
concave, twice continuously differentiable and satisfies 
¢(0,.,.) = 0 
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This means that current education jet is essential for a positive rate of 
growth of human capital. Population grows at a constant proportional rate: 
(6) Nt = (1 + n)Nt-l n > -1; N0 > 0. 
Ve also have: 
Since jgt > O, our specification of the human capital investment function 
implies that per Gapita human capital never declines. It would be easy to 
allow for human capital depreciation, "forgetting", and other snags in the 
intergenerational transmission of knowledge, without this affecting the key 
qualitative properties of our model. 
Household j of generation 2 behaves competitively (takes "'t+l' rt+l and 
rt+2 as given) and also takes jh~ , jr!, jr~, 0t' ~t and jgt as given. We 
assume that each household from a given generation within a country are 
identical. Ve can therefore drop the j subscript and write the solution to 
the household optimization problem as follows: 








To gain the advantage of closed-form solutions we shall consider the 
special case where the single-period utility is of the constant elasticity of 
marginal utility form, that is 
1(14a) u(x) = v(x) = 1: x - 1; ; ~ 0.1 
In addition we'll assume that the human capital growth rate function¢ 
takes the constant returns Cobb-Douglas form given in (14b) 
a( · )1-a
et mt gt et mt+ gt
(14b) ¢(a, :o, :o) = n--◊--- o ~a~ 1; n > o 
ht ht ht ht 
We have chosen the special case where the public sector inputs into the 
education process, g, are perfect substitutes for the private sector traded 
inputs, m. It would be easy to extend the analysis to the case where they are 
imperfect substitutes or where the private traded input is strictly more or 
less productive in the education process than the public input20. Note from 
our specification of the private budget constraint (10) that public 
expenditure on education benefiting the i th individual can only be enjoyed by 
the i th individual: it is excludable and rival. It cannot be resold. This of 
course will matter only if them~ 0 constraint is binding. 
The household decision rules for the foreign country are completely 
analogous to those for the home country given in equations (7) to (13) and 
will not be reproduced here. Parameters, variables and functions with the 
* superscript will characterize the foreign country. Note that while all 
taste and policy parameters can differ between the two countries, the 
production function (introduced below) and the human capital accumulation 
technology, represented by the¢ function are the same in both countries. 
b. Firm behavior. 
Firms are competitive and maximize profits. Both factors of production 
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(labor and capital) can be varied costlessly at parametric factor prices. 
Output, iy is sold in a competitive world market. For the moment we assume 
that the production function is linear homogeneous in the two factors of 
production that can be varied at the discretion of the firm. In the home 
country, firm i, i = 1, ... ,1 faces the production function 
(lS) iYt = F(ikt' iht) 
This function is linear homogeneous in the i th firm's two private inputs, 
capital ikt and efficiency units of labor iht' with F(O,.) = F(.,O) = O, 
increasing in both its arguments, strictly concave, twice continuously 
differentiable and satisfies the Inada conditions: lim ~ = 1/lim ~ = 
.k~o i .k~ro i 
1 1 
1 . oF l/l. BF1m 7J1i = 1m 7J1i = ro . Capital depreciation is ignored. 
.h~o i .h~ro i 
1 1 
The linear homogeneity of the production function permits us to write: 
.yt/.ht = F(.kt/.ht, 1) = f(.kt/.ht)l" l 1 1 1 1 
The first-order conditions for optimal use of capital and labor are: 
rt = f, (/t/iht) 
wt= f(ikt/iht) - (ikt/iht)f'(ikt/iht) 
We assume all firms in the domestic economy to be identical. Dropping 
the subscript i we write the aggregate production function for the home 
country and the representative domestic firm's first order conditions as 
follows: 
(16) Yt = F(Kt' Ht)= Htf(Kt/Ht) 
(17) rt= f'(Kt/Ht) 
(18) wt= f(Kt/Ht) (Kt/Ht)f•(Kt/Ht) = M(Kt/Ht)' 
M' = -(Kt/Ht)f••(Kt/Ht) > 0. 
The derivation of foreign country output, interest rate and wage rate is 




We also assume that at the initial date, t = O, K0 + K0 > 0. 
(c) The government. 
In both countries the government spends on the education of its young, 
levies lump-sum taxes on the middle aged and the old, taxes all asset income 
of its residents, pays interest on its debt and borrows to finance any excess 
of current outlays over current revenues. Government debt is single-period 
debt denominated in the traded output. The outstanding stock of home country 
* 
government debt outstanding is Bt. Foreign government debt is denoted Bt. 
The home country government budget identities is given in equation (19). The 
conventional solvency constraints, given in (20) is assumed to apply. The 
foreign country counterparts are obvious and have been omitted. 
(19) 
(20) 
* B0 and B0 are given. 
(d) larket equilibrium. 
There is perfect international mobility of financial capital. In the 
absence of distortionary source-based taxes on capital income, the domestic 
and foreign before-tax interest rates and rates of return on fixed capital 
will be equalized. 
(21) 
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The after-tax rates of return to private saving, 1 + rt - Ot in the home 
* country and 1 + rt - Ot in the foreign country, however, can differ. These 
policy-induced distortions are quite separate from the distortions due to the 
externalities in human capital formation. 
From the production function, equalization of capital-human capital 
ratios in the two economies implies that the wage rates (of efficiency labor) 
in the two countries are also equalized, although labor itself is not traded 
internationally. 
(22) 
The fact that both countries' labor markets clear each period means that 
(23a) 1 Ht= ht-lNt-1 
* *1 * (23b) Ht= ht-lNt-1 
The condition for equilibrium rn the world capital market is given in 
equation (24), where equalization of domestic and foreign interest rates and 
wage rates has already been imposed. 
(l + rt - Ot - ~t)mt-l]Nt-1 - mtNt 
* * * * * * 
- (l + rt - Ot - ~t)mt-l]Nt-1 - mtNt 
The total stock of non-human assets at the end of period t (the beginning 
* * of period t+l) Kt+l + Kt+l + Bt+l + Bt+l has to be willingly held by the 
private sectors of the two countries. The old (those born in period t-2) will 
not be holding any assets: they have at the end of period t just exhausted the 
last of their lifetime savings. The savings of the middle aged (those born in 
period t-1) will be the sum of their piimary (non-interest) current surpluses 
during middle age ([wth!_1 - c!_1 - 7!_1] per person of generation t-1 in the 
case of the home country) and their compounded primary current surpluses from 
their youth (- (1 + rt - Ot - ~t)mt-l per person of generation t-1 rn the case 
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of the home country). The young at the end of period t (those born in period 
t) will have negative savings equal to the value of their borrowing to finance 
their education (student loans). In ·the case of the home country this amounts 
to savings of -mt per person of generation t. Home country private financial 
wealth at the beginning of period t+l, St+l is given by (25). Zt+l denotes 
the net foreign assets of the home country at the beginning of period t+l. 
* Note that Z = - Z . 
_ 1 1 1 
(25 ) 8t+l = [wtht-1 - ct-1 - 7 t-1 - (l + rt - Ot - Wt)mt-l]Nt-1 - mtNt 
Equation (24) can be obtained from the global goods market equilibrium 
condition in (26), the two private sector life-time budget constraints (10 in 
the case of the home country), the two public sector budget identities (19) 
for the home country and (20), the "exhaustion of output by factor payments" 
conditions (27a) and (27b) and the condition given in (28) that what the old 
in period t spend on consumption and taxes must be equal to the principal plus 
(net of tax) interest they carried forward from the previous period. 
* * * 
(26) yt + yt = Kt+l - Kt+ Kt+l - Kt 




+ rt - ot 
* * * * Kt+ Kt + 8t + 8t + mt-lNt-1 + mt-lNt-1 
* * * . * Defining the notation: k =K/H; k =K /H ; b =B/H and b _ B*/H* , 
equation (24) can be rewritten as: 
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*1 * * t 
h_t_N_0_[1 + n] b* 
hi NO 1 + n t+1 
= 
To achieve an equilibrium for this 2-country economy that is Pareto 
efficient, the two governments are required to. subsidize human capital 
formation in order to internalize the externality, to forswear the use of 
distortionary taxes and possibly to choose their human capital accumulation 
* inputs g and g to achieve productive efficiency. In addition one of the 
governments may have to use lump-sum taxes and transfers to ensure dynamic 
efficiency 21. The first-best policy to internalize the externali ty is to 
subsidize time spent by the young in education, et. In our model such an 
education subsidy is equivalent either to a subsidy on the wage earned by the 
middle aged or to a tax on leisure. 
If in our model we also permitted the young to work (in addition to 
choosing between leisure and education), and if work did not produce a human 
capital externality, then the equivalence between a subsidy to education, a 
tax on leisure and a wage subsidy to the middle-aged would break down. 
Efficiency would then require a subsidy to education or a tax both on leisure 
and on time spent working while young. The equivalence between an education 
subsidy and a tax on leisure would also breaks down when the middle-aged can 
choose leisure, unless age discrimination can be built into the leisure tax. 
A subsidy to borrowing by the young for educational expenditures is not needed 
in the first best. If a tax on leisure or a wage subsidy are not feasible, 
then subsidizing student loans will be a second-best policy. Subsidizing 
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private borrowing in general will be next best. 
(e) International productivity differentials. 
Note that Yt = Htf(kt) = ht_1 1Nt_1f(kt). Output per worker Il in the home 
country is given by 
Tit= Yt/Nt-1 = h!_1f(kt) 
The rate of growth of output per worker, 1r is given by 
0t+1 
,rt =~ - 1 
t 
Similarly, with a common technology and free capital mobility, we have for the 
foreign country: 
* * * *1 
Ilt = Yt/Nt-1 = ht-1f(kt) 
* TI 
'/f* t -- =¥-1 
nt 
It follows that the differences in the growth rate of output per worker are 
due solely to (and are (almost) equal to) differences in the growth rate of 
human capital per worker22: 
1 *1 
* ht ht f(kt+1)
(30) '/ft - '/ft = [-1- - -ri- h(k)
ht-1 ht-1 t 
Indeed, in steady state, the labor productivity growth differential is 
given by: 
* 
{31) '/f - 'Ir 
(f) Investment shares and growth rate differentials. 
Our model has some strong implications concerning growth rate 
differentials and investment share differences. The causation, however, runs 
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from the exogenous or policy-determined growth differentials to the endogenous 
investment shares. In our model the home-country investment share is given by 
Considering only steady states for simplicity, we have that 
The excess of the home country steady-state share of fixed capital 
formation in growth rate GDP over the foreign share is therefore given by 
* * * kK,-K, = [(1 + 1r)(1 + n) - (1 + ,r )(1 + n )]f(l<T 
The exogenous growth differential therefore drives the endogenous investment 
share difference23. 
(g) The global equilibrium. 
As the focus of this paper is on productivity growth rate differentials 
rather than on the levels in the individual countries, it will turn out to be 
possible, under conditions to be stated below, to ignore the evolution (and 
endogenous response) of such global variables as the capital-human capital 
* ratio k and the two public debt-human capital ratios band b . A few words 
about one feature of the long-run or steady-state equilibrium are however in 
order. 
* 1 1 *1 *1Consider the case where the fiscal variables 0, 0, rt/ht and rt /ht, 
1 * *1gt/ht, gt/ht are constants and the two national public debt-human capital 
* * ratios are also constants, that is bt = b for all t and bt = b for all t. 
Lump-sum taxes on the old r~/hi and r;2/h;1 adjust so as to satisfy the public 
sector budget identities. 
There are two different kinds of steady state solutions. In the first, 
the long run growth rate of aggregate human capital differs between the two 
countries. In the second they are the same. 
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Consider first the case of differential long-run growth rates of the 
aggregate national human capital stocks. Yithout loss of generality we 
consider the case where the relative weight of the foreign country in the 
*1 * * t 
ht No[l+n]global capital market - -- -- =ut decreases steadily, that is the growth 
ht1 N0 1+n 
rate of aggregate human capital in the home country is higher than in the 
foreign country. Note that this does not necessarily require that home 
1 *1country per capita human capital ht grows at a faster rate than ht ; 
population growth rates matter as much as the growth rates of per capita human 
capital. Yhich country dominates the capital markets in the long run depends 
on relative size (measured by population in efficiency units) alone. 
From (29) we notice that the long run or steady-state global 
capital-human capital ratio k is governed by the parameters describing private 
sector and government behavior in the home country alone according to 
2 2 
k + b = c + r m 
h1(1 + n)(1 + f'(k) - 0) - T 
The second case is where there exists a steady state value of relative 
foreign country size ut that is neither zero nor infinite but some positive 
constant value u24 • In this case the appropriate steady-state condition for 
global capital market equilibrium will continue to reflect the parameters 
characterizing private sector and government behavior in both countrjes 
according to their relative weight, as shown in the following equation: 
2 2* C + r m(1 + u)k + b + ub = 1 -7 
+ f'(k) - 0)h tl + n)(l*2 *2 
+ r+ U C 
h 1(1 + n )(1 + f'(k) - 0) - ::l] 
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(3) A SIIPLE EXAMPLE. 
Consider the following special case where the single-period utility 
functions in both countries are logarithmic (r = 1), the growth rates of human 
* capital depend only on education (a= 1) and gt= gt= 0. From a= 1 it 
* follows immediately that mt= mt= 0. 
It is well-known that in OLG models such as ours, absent distortionary 
taxes, debt financing of public expenditure matters for the real equilibrium 
only to the extent that it redistributes lifetime resources between 
generations. For instance, issuing public debt when debt service is financed 
with taxes on the middle-aged, is equivalent to balanced-budget 
intergenerational redistribution from the middle-aged to the old, that is, it 
is equivalent to an increase in the scale of an unfunded social security 
retirement scheme. As long as there are no distortionary taxes, we could 
therefore restrict the analysis of taxes, transfers and public debt to 
balanced budget redistribution between the middle-aged and the old. 
Clearly, when there are distortionary taxes such as our asset income 
taxes, the ability to alter the time profile of distortionary tax rates by 
unbalancing the budget will have real consequences. 
The home country household equilibrium for this special case is given by 
2 
ct 




(33) - = Pwt+11/ 
lt 
0(34) lt = ht - et 
(35) h! = h~ + 11et = (1 + 11)h~ - 11lt 
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2 2 
1 1 1 ct - rt
(36) htwt+l - ct - rt ....., --,-----....--- = O
l + rt+2 - 0t+2 
In addition we have the equation for the home country intergenerational 
transmission of human capital (37) and the home country government budget 
identity (38): 
(37) 
Obvious counterparts to each of the last seven equations exist for the 
foreign country. The world-wide capital market equilibrium condition is 
* equation (29) with mt= mt= 0 for all t. 
2We obtain the following solution for ct: 
2 fJ
2
(l + rt+2 -
(39) ct= 21 + fJ + fJ 
2 
. ct
Smee it= , it follows that the growth of human2fJ (1 + rt+2 - O)wt+l .. 
capital in the home country is governed by equation (40), with a parallel 
equation for the foreign country: 
(40) hl = {J(l + {J)(l + q) hl 
t [1 + {J + {32] t-1 
2 
1 1 rt 
+ (1 + {J + {J2)w(kt+l) [rt+ -1.,--+_f.,....,-,{...-kt_+_2....-)--__,,0t_+_2-] 
From equation (40) it is clear that, at a given value of k, the rate of 
growth of human capital per capita between period t and period t+l depends on 
three factors. Two of these can differ between the countries. They are the 
• rate of time preference (1 - {J)/{J and the present discounted value of the net 
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lifetime transfer of resources away from members of generation t through the 
2 
1 rt 
government budget rt+ 1 + rt+2 - 8t+2 
The third is part of the technology, assumed to be common to both countries. 
It is the productivity or efficiency of the human capital accumulation 
process, measured by n-
At a given value of the ratio of non-human to human capital k, a lower 
time preference rate, that is a larger subjective discount factor P means a 
.relatively.higher valuation of future vs. current consumption. It implies a 
higher rate of accumulation of human capital by the young (as well as an 
increased desire for financial saving by the middle-aged). 
Similarly, at a given value of k, a net increase in lifetime resources of 
a generation increases consumption of all normal goods. Leisure is a normal 
good. Education or human capital formation will decline as a result. 
Anything that reduces the present discounted value of the lifetime taxes paid 
by a generation will reduce human capital formation by that generation. For 
instance, the anticipated (in period t) substitution of borrowing for taxes on 
the middle-aged in period t+l (a reduction in r1) or for taxes on the old 1n 
period t+2 (a reduction in r~) will reduce the human capital accumulation 
effort of the generation born in period t and thus the period t growth rate of 
human capital. 
An increase inn will stimulate human capital accumulation at a given 
value of k, even though it will, through the effect it has on the demand for 
leisure, reduce the time spent on education in natural units. Education 
measured in efficiency units increases. 
Using equations (30), (40) and the foreign counterpart of (40), the 
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difference between the national growth rates of output per worker can be 
written as: 
T}){ /3(1 + /3) 2(41J 't - .; = [c1 + 
[1 + /3 + /3 ] 
It is clear from (41) that, given zero net lifetime expected fiscal 
2 1 
1 1 . 7 tfht-1
transfers to generation t in both countries (rt/ht-l + 1--,,-..,.......-....----..---- = + f'(kt+2) - 0t+2 
*2 *1 
*1 *1 7 t /ht-1
rt /ht-l + 1 + f'(k )- O* = 0), the more patient country will have the t+2 t+2 
* * higher productivity growth rate in period t: /3 >_/3 implies rt> rt. Also, if 
* /3 = /3, then the country that is expected to make the larger life time fiscal 
transfer to generation twill have the lower growth rate of productivity in 
period t. 
Also from (41), a set of sufficient conditions for being able to perform 
productivity growth differential comparative dynamics while ignoring the 
* effects of exogenous shocks on k, band b is that only steady states are 
considered (kt+l = kt) and that the initial values of the four lump-sum tax 
1 2 *1 *2parameters are zero (rt = rt = rt = rt = 0) 2s. 
Another set of sufficient conditions for being able to analyze the effect 
on the productivity growth differential of parameter and policy changes, 
without consideration of the effect of such changes on the economy-wide state 
* variables k, b and b , is also immediately apparent from ( 41). . It is that all 
shocks are evaluated at an initial symmetric equilibrium; this means that in 
the initial equilibrium all private sector behavioral parameters and policy 
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instrument values * * 1 1are identical in the two countries: P =P; Ot = Ot; rt/ht-l 
*1 *1 2 1 *2 *1 = rt /ht-1; rt/ht-1 = rt /ht-l. \le shall refer to this as the symmetric case. 
Note that in neither of these cases do distortionary asset income tax 
rates affect the growth rate differential. In the general case, they can, 
from equation (41), affect the differential by altering the present discounted 
value. of life time lump-sum transfers to members of generation t (for a given 
value of kt+l) and by altering kt+l' \'hen, as in the next Section, the young 
borrow to finance the use of produced inputs in the accumulation of human 
capital (0 <a< 1), there is another channel through which distortionary 
taxes influence the rate of growth differential: the after-tax interest rate 
* *(which is a function of 0, '{J ,0 and '{J even at a given value of k) influences 
the demand by the young for the produced human capital accumulation input. 
Under either of these two sets of sufficient conditions, the effects of 
private parameter changes or policy changes on home country productivity 
growth at a given value of k are the same as the effects on the productivity 
growth differential discussed earlier in this Section. 
(4) TRADED PRIVATE AND PUBLIC INPUTS IN HUMAN CAPITAL ACCUMULATION. 
\'hen we consider the general constant elasticity of marginal utility 
single-period utility function (1 ! 0) and traded inputs are permitted as an 
argument in the function for the growth rate of human capital (0 $a$ 1), 




Privately optimal choice of mt may involve (for sufficiently large gt) a 
corner solution at mt= 0. For the case where the constraint mt> 0 is not 
binding, we have the additional first order condition: 
(42) 1 + rt+l - Ot+l - ~t+l = wt+l~(l - a)e~ (mt+ gt)-a 
Finally, the human capital accumulation function is now 
1 0 a( )1-a(35') ht= ht+ ~et mt+ gt 
For positive values of a, the growth of human capital in the home country 




The interpretation of this is clearer when we write down the solutions 
for the two inputs in the human capital accumulation process 
1 2 
(44) et= fl3[hi-1(n2nI - wt+l) + r! + 1:;t+2-0t+2 - (l+rt+1-0t+1-~t+l)gt] 
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Equation (45) holds of course only when the constraint mt~ 0 is not binding. 
For the foreign country, equations analogous to (43), (44) and (45) can 
be derived. Noting that a, ~,wand rare the same in the two countries, the 
* 
foreign equations are obtained by attaching the superscript to each,, P, g, 
71, 72, 0 and~ in equations (43) to (45). We again are considering only the 
effect of variations in the parameters describing private sector behavior and 
fiscal policy on productivity growth differentials. For simplicity we also focus 
on perturbations of an initial symmetric equilibrium, which now amounts to the 
* 
restriction that in the initial equilibrium we have P = P; 
* 1 1 *1 *1 2 1 *2 *1 1 
~t = ~t; 7t/ht-1 = 7t /ht-1; 7t/ht-1 = 7t /ht-1 and gt/ht-1 
technologies are, as always, constrained to be identical. In this Section the 
net lifetime fiscal transfer to generation tis assumed to be equal to zero, 
2 
1 7t 
that is 7t + l+rt+2-0t+2 - (l+rt+l-Ot+l-~t+l)gt 
*2 
*1 7 t * * * 
= 7t + ---~- (l+rt+l-Ot+l-~t+l)gt = O 
l+rt+2-0t+2 
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It is easily checked that under these conditions an increase in the value 
of f3 raises the growth rate of per capita human capital in the home country 
relative to the growth rate of per capita human capital in the foreign 
country. This result is independent of the value of 7. Greater home country 
patience achieves this relatively higher rate of growth of productivity by 
raising both et and mt relative to the foreign country. 
Note that with borrowing by the young to finance the purchase of traded 
inputs into the human capital accumulation process, the effect of a lower rate 
of time preference (a higher value of /3) on home country relative private 
financial wealth is ambiguous. This is true even if there is no government 
debt. 'While a higher value of /3 will cause the middle-aged to save more, it 
will also cause the young to dissave more by taking out more "student loans" 
(see equation (25)). Since the increased value of the human capital assets 
acquired by the young is not counted in conventionally measured saving, the 
net effect of an increase in /3 on conventionally measured private financial 
wealth is ambiguous. 
The analysis of the effects of a change in t.p, the subsidy rate on student 
loans, is straightforward. Consider the case where the value of gt equals 
zero 26 • The reduction in cost of borrowing by the young increases mt. The 
effect on time spent on education, et, is ambiguous, since, if the initial 
value of mt is positive, the increase in the subsidy rate will have a positive 
income effect which cet. par. would increase the demand for leisure. Since 
consumption during middle age and during old age are both normal goods, 
however, the effect on the total amount of resources transferred from youth to 
middle age is positive. The relative growth rate of productivity in period t 
therefore increases in the home country. 
The effect of an increase in O on relative home country prorluctivi ty 
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growth (in a symmetric equilibrium) is the same as that of an increase in~ if 
in addition 7t2 = 0. There is of course a further impact on global savings 
through the effect of an increase in Oon the intertemporal terms of trade of 
the middle-aged. 
As long as the non-negativity constraint on private spending on education 
(mt~ 0) is not binding and (43), (44) and (45) hold, an increase in public 
spending on education (gt) will, cet. par. lead to a reduction in mt + gt, the 
total amount spent on education by the private and public sectors combined. 
Time spent on education, et, will also be reduced and the growth rate of 
human capital will decline unambiguously. 
The intuition is clear: as a profit maxjmizing firm facing a given wage 
and interest rate, the young worker would respond to the in-kind free gift of 
gt by reducing his private input of mt one for one. The free gift of gt' 
however, also has an income effect on the young worker as a consumer (see 
equation (43) in which gt enters (properly discounted) as a net transfer to 
the household on a par with -7! and -7~. The net result is the more than 
100 percent crowding out of private education spending by public spending on 
education apparent in the last term on the R.H.S. of equation (45). 
If the increase in public spending on the education of a member of 
generation t, gt, is financed during period t through borrowing and if the 
additional public debt thus incurred is serviced and repaid in periods t+l 
and/or t+2 through increased lump-sum taxes on members of that same generation 
t, (that is through increases in r! and/or in r~) then of course there will 
1 2 )-1not be any change in -gt(l + rt+l- Ot+l - ~t+l) +rt+ rt(l + rt+2 - Ot+2 · 
Absent any income effect from the increase in public spending on education, 
the "direct crowding out'' (Buiter [1977]) of private by public spending is of 
course exactly one-for-one. 
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If the policy aim is to boost human capital formation, this model 
suggests that increasing public spending on education while the private sector 
still engages in private spending on education, would not be very smart 27 • An 
obviously superior policy is the one actually pursued (up to a point) by most 
goverliments in the real world: the removal of the education decision from the 
realm of private decision making. Compulsory school attendance up to a·· 
certain age is indeed the rule in most societies. It can be checked easily 
that with administrative assignment of e and of g and access to 
non-distortionary taxes, Pareto-efficient equilibria can be supported. 
\Then the mt ~ 0 constraint is binding (which will .only be the case when 
gt> 0) , the private optimum is characterized by the following equations: 
The equilibrium amount of time spent on education can be solved from 
2 
rt1 1
rt + =1 + - wt+lht-1rt+2 -Ot+2 
The effect of an increase 1n public spending on education, gt, on private 
time spent on education is ambiguous. The increase in the quantity of the 
complementary factor of production gt raises the marginal return to another 
hour spent on education. The income effect, however, goes the other way and 
suggests an increase in the demand for leisure. Even when et declines, 
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however, the net effect of the growth rate of human capital is positive. The 
intuition for this is that the positive income effect of the increase in 
public spending also raises the demand for cf and c~. The net.effect of an 
increase in gt on h! is therefore positive when the non-negativity constraint 
on mt is binding. 
Inter-country differences in productivity growth rates disappear when all 
inputs into human capital accumulation are tradable. We could analyze this 
case by considering the case where a= 0 and non-traded time is not an input 
into human capital accumulation. The problem with this is that, unless by 
chance 1 + rt+l - 0t+l = nwt+l , we will have a corner solution for the traded 
human capital accumulation input. The home country private sector equilibrium 
conditions are for this case: 
2 2 
ct + rt 
-mt(l + -,------..---- = 01 + rt+2 - 0t+2 
hl = ho 
t t 
[:!r C 
lt = h~ 
mt= 0 
= ro if 1 + rt+1 Ot+1 - ~t+1 > nwt+l 
This knife-edge solution reflects the fact that when a= O, our education 
technology is linear in an input which can be purchased at a parametric price 
and which does not enter directly into the strictly concave utility function. 
*While in general equilibrium finite values of mt (and mt) will still be 
ensured through the endogeneity of the wage rate and the interest rate, it is 
convenient to respecify the human capital accumulation function for the case 
where only traded inputs enter as follows: 
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0(,\(1. 
Vith this strictly concave accumulation function the first order 
condition for optimal private choice of mt becomes, when the non-negativity 
constraint on mt is not binding 
(46) l + rt+l - 8t+l - ~t+l 
Vith perfect international mobility of financial capital and no 
differential source-based taxes on capital rentals, the before-tax interest 
rate will be equalized in the world economy. Vith a common production 
function the wage rate (per unit of efficiency labor) will also be equalized 
throughout ·the world economy. Vith a common human capital accumulation 
technology (common values of 1/ and,\ in this example), the equilibrium values 
of mt+ gt will be the same throughout the world economy. Taste parameters 
* (such as P and P) therefore no longer matter for differences in productivity 
growth rates. Neither do redistributive lump-sum taxation or public sector 
deficits. The only aspect of fiscal policy in our model that matters for 
growth differentials a.re the tax rates on non-human asset income and student 
loan subsidy rates (0, 0,* ~and~*) 28 • Different source-based capital rental 
tax rates would cet. par. cause different wages to be generated in the parts 
of the world where they apply. By raising the return to human capital 
accumulation a higher home country relative real wage would cet. par. increase 
mt and thus the relative growth rate of home country human capital. 
Note from equation (46) that a permanently higher subsidy rate on student 
loans in the home country (a higher value of ~) will cet. par. be associated 
with a permanently higher home country relative growth rate of human capital 
and a permanently higher relative rate of growth of output per worker. An 
increase in the home country tax rate on all saving (subsidy rate on all 
borrowing) 0 will have the same effects. 
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Also from equation (46), higher public spending on education would cet. 
par. (i.e. without allowing for possible consequences for the world rate of 
interest and the wage rate of the financing decisions associated with higher 
public spending) only crowd out private spending on education one-for-one: 
d(mt + gt) = 029. 
If the non-negativity constraint mt~ 0 on private expenditure on 
education is binding, the government can of course boost the growth rate of 
human capital simply by raising gt, its own expenditure on education. 
Returning to the general case of O 5 a< 1, it is easy to consider the 
difference made by the existence of national source-based taxation (at a rate 
~* 
0 in the home country and O in the foreign country) of the rental income from 
capital instead of national residence-based taxation of the income from all 
non-human wealth. Student loan subsidies are also omitted. With free 
international mobility of financial capital we now have equalization of 
after-tax rates of return to physical capital, that is 
( 47) 
ll'ith source-based capital taxation, perfect capital mobility and a common 
technology, the home country wage rate will be above the foreign wage rate if 
~* 
and only if O is below O • Even if all other private and policy parameters 
are identical, different wage rates will be associated with different 
* productivity growth rates. In the logarithmic case (1 = "f = 1) it is very 
easy to see that the country with the higher real wage will have the higher 
growth rate of productivity 30 
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(5) GOVERNMENT BORROWING AND LUMP-SUM INTERGENERATIONAL REDISTRIBUTION: 
MUST WHAT HELPS SAVING HURT HUMAN CAPITAL FORMATION? 
The budget identity and the solvency constraint (assumed to hold with­
strict equality) of the home government (equations (19) and (21a)) together 
imply the following present value budget constraint: 
2 2oo r1 c2 + T . 22 8 -{ t+i-1 rt+i-2 [ t+i-2 t+I-(48) ht = + 0 ]t+l 1 ( ) hi .(l+n) 2 + t+i (l+f'(kt -) 2 1 i = 0 ht+i l+n +l +l Ot+l)(l+n) ht+i 
m . 1
(O . ) t+l-
- t+i + ~t+i hi+i(l+n) 
h11 . (l+n)
IT t+l8t ' =+l 
j=O htl . 1(1+f'(kt -))+1- +l 
All this says is that the outstanding value of the public debt should be 
equal to the present discounted value of the future primary (non-interest) 
public sector budget surplus.es. Holding constant the path of public spending 
on goods and services, a tax cut this period will require a future tax 
increase of equal present discounted_ value. The required tax increase may of 
course be spread out over many future periods. 
While the competitive equilibria of OLG models such as the one we are 
considering may be dynamically inefficient 31, we shall consider the 
consequences of a cut in lump-sum taxes during period t when the interest rate 
is above the growth rate of human capital in each period. Any government, 
acting unilaterally, could issue debt or vary lump-sum taxation to achieve a 
national Pareto improvement if dynamic inefficiency prevailed (see Buiter and 
Kletzer [1990a, 1990b]). For simplicity, the distortionary tax rates Oand~ 
and their foreign counterparts O* and~* are set equal to zero in what 
* follows, as are domestic and foreign exhaustive public spending g and g . 
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Again all policy changes are perturbations of an initial symmetric 
equilibrium. 
1In period t the government can only change rt-l' the tax on the middle 
aged, and rt_2 2, the tax on the old. Period t human capital formation is 
performed by the young in that period, that is by generation t. Human capital 
formation in period twill only be a function of expectations at time t 
concerning r! and r~. The behavior of members of _generation t during period t 
is therefore only affected by tax changes in period t to the extent that such 
changes in r{_1 and r~_2 carry announcement effects concerning r{ and r~, the 
taxes they will pay when middle-aged and old. Of course, if the changes in 
1 · 2
rt-land rt_2 are news with respect to the information set of period t-1, then 
the saving behavior of the middle-aged in period twill be affected. The 
scope for time-inconsistent policy behavior in a model like ours is clearly 
considerable. For reasons of space these issues will not be considered 
further. 
Any change in the government's policy concerning borrowing and lump-sum 
taxes and transfers that increase (reduces) the net life-time fiscal transfer 
2 
1 rtto generation t, that is Tt =-[rt+ 1 . _ )32 ,will reduce human0+ rt+2 t+2 
capital formation by that generation that period (see equation (43)). ~ill 
all policies that achieve an increase in Tt have an unambiguous effect on 
national saving in that period or beyond? 
Let national financial wealth at the beginning of period t be denoted Jt. 
It follows that 
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It is clear from equation {45) that an increase in Tt' the net life-time 
fiscal transfer to generation twill, by raising life-time resources, 
increases the demand for leisure, reduces human capital formation and 
therefore reduces mt' the amount of the complementary human capital 
accumulation input demanded. Since the resources to pay for mt have to be 
borrowed (student loans), national saving cet. par. increases as a result of 
the same fiscal action that reduces human capital formation. To determine 
what will happen in periods beyond t to national saving, we shall consider two 
· canonical special cases. 
The first change in the borrowing-lump-sum tax/transfer mix is a 
permanent balanced budget tax cut in favor of the middle-aged financed by an 
increase in taxes on the old. For simplicity let bt = 0 for all t. 'What this 
amounts to is a permanent reduction in the scale of the unfunded social 
security retirement scheme. 'When middle-aged each person has a tax cut of 
amountµ and when old a tax increase of (1 + n)µ. That is: 
1 2drt . = -(1 + n)-1drt . = µ < 0 for all i ~ -2.- +1 +1-1 
The present discounted value of lifetime taxes falling on generation t+i 
r 2+1. - n]changes byµ 1t+ which is negative if the interest rate exceeds the[ + rt 2 ·+ +1 
rate of growth of population, as we assume. 'With leisure a normal good, this 
policy therefore reduces forever more the home country allocation of time to 
education and thus the rate of growth of the stock of human capital relative 
to that in the rest of the world. From equation (43) it will forever lower 
the growth rate of home country labor productivity relative to the growth rate 
of labor productivity in the foreign country. 
As noted before, the increase in Tt (for all tin our example) will 
reduce mt together with et. This reduction in financial dissaving by the 
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young is reinforced by the middle-aged, for familiar life-cycle reasons. The 
reduction in the size of the home country unfunded social security retirement 
scheme will increase saving by the middle aged and therefore raise the total 
national stock of non-human assets held by domestic residents (this does not 
require the interest rate to be above the population growth rate). 
What we have here is an example of the general point that in our model, 
permanent changes in the intergenerational distribution of income brought about by 
changes in government borrowing, lump-sum taxes and transfers that boost domestic 
saving will tend to reduce human capital formation and conversely. 
A second example of a similar (negative) permanent effect on human 
capital formation and (positive) permanent effect on financial saving is that 
of a debt-financed quasi-permanent tax cut for the young: in period tan 
(unexpected) one-time tax is levied on the old or the middle-aged. The 
revenues from this one-time levy are used to retire public debt. For 
simplicity assume the outstanding public debt is reduced to zero following the 
levy. The present discounted value of all net future tax receipts too is 
therefore reduced to zero. This "present value tax dividend'' can be 
distributed (in many different ways) across generations in such a manner that 
the present discounted value of lifetime taxes for all current and future 
generations (except the unfortunate current old or middle-aged) is lower. For 
instance, one could give the middle-aged each period after t the same size tax 
cut, with the value of the tax cut determined by the requirement that their 
present discounted value be equal to the original tax levy in period t. 
This policy would clearly raise the permanent income (at given wages and 
interest rates) of all generations born in period tor later. It would 
therefore reduce their expenditure of resources on human capital formation and 
their borrowing while young to finance human capital formation. The future 
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middle-aged would all increase their saving for life-cycle purposes. Again, 
relative human capital formation and national saving would move in opposite 
directions. 
(6) CONCLUSION. 
The presence of a non-traded ("home-grown") human capital good which is 
an essential input in its own accumulation is sufficient for the existence of 
persistent international differentials in levels and growth rates of labor 
productivity. This is true even though there is perfect international 
mobility of financial and physical capital and technologies are identical 
across the world. 
A higher subjective rate of time preference will lower a country's 
relative rate of growth by reducing the relative rate of accumulation of human 
capital. 
A higher public debt burden will, to the extent that it represents a net 
intergenerational redistribution towards the old (which will be. the case if 
taxes are typically paid by the working generation and public debt is 
typically owned by the old), increase the relative growth rate of human 
capital and output. That is, deficit financing policies and lump-sum 
intergenerational redistribution policies that boost financial saving will 
reduce the relative rate of human capital accumulation and the relative growth 
rate of labor productivity. 
In the tradition of Uzawa [1965] and Lucas [1988], the human capital 
accumulation process involves positive external effects. A first-best policy 
towards human capital accumulation requires subsidies to education or, in our 
model, a tax on leisure or a wage subsidy. The same result can of course also 
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be achieved command-style, that is through administrative assignment of time 
and resources spent on schooling, overriding individual choice. Improvements 
over the unassisted decentralized equilibrium that fall short of full Pareto 
efficiency are achieved by subsidizing private borrowing for educational 
expenditure (student loans). 
Vhen public spending on education is neither more not less efficient than 
private spending, an increase in public spending on education will crowd out 
private spending more than one-to-one, unless the income effect of the public 
transfer in kind for the generation receiving it is offset by increases in 
taxes. 
A higher subsidy rate to student loans will raise the relative growth 
rate of productivity and a higher source-based tax on capital income will 
lower it. Residence-based taxes will in addition affect world-wide 
productivity growth through their effect on the world rate of interest. They 
affect the productivity growth differential only through its differential effect 
on the cost of borrowing to finance private educational expenditures. Changes 
in source-based taxes also affect global saving. They have a differential 
effect on productivity growth by altering relative wages. 
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FOOTNOTES 
lThe terms labor productivity, output per worker, output per person hour 
and output per capita will be used interchangeably. 
2'fhese models themselves are 2-country versions either of Diamond's famous 
2-period Samuelsonian OLG model with a neoclassical production function · 
(Diamond [1965]) or of the Yaari-Blanchard-Weil OLG model. Another example is 
Chang [1990]. · 
3Alogoskoufis and van der Ploeg [1990a,b] contain the first applications
(that we know of) of the OLG private consumption specification to endogenous
~rowth. Unlike our model which uses the (3-period variant of the) Samuelson 
L1958] OLG model, Alogoskoufis and van der Ploeg use the Yaari-Blanchard-Weil 
version of the OLG model. At the same Tokyo Conference at which an early
version of this paper was presented, Alogoskoufis and van der Ploeg also 
presented a two-country OLG endogenous growth model with perfect international 
capital mobility. Because their model does not have an essential non-traded 
growth input, it implies convergent growth rates (Alogoskoufis and van der 
Ploeg (1991]) . 
4Qther papers analyzing the consequences of the use of distortionary taxes 
in (closed) endogenous growth models are Rebelo [1990], King and Rebelo [1990]
and Barro and Sala i Martin [1990a]. The latter also consider productive
public spending. Jones and Manuelli [1990] analyze an infinite-lived 
representative agent version of the open economy endogenous growth model with 
distortionary taxes. 
5Examples include Grossman and Helpman [1989a,b,c,d; 1990] and 
Feenstra [1990]. 
6In the macroeconomic literature Lucas [1988, pp.14-17] recognizes and 
emphasizes the importance of factor mobility assumptions for the predictions
of neo-classical growth theory. It is equally important for endogenous growth
theory with non-increasing returns (of which our paper is an example) and for 
endogenous growth theory with increasing returns. 
7We should note that Grossman and Helpman [1990] do allow trade in 
intermediate goods in a model in which technological knowledge concerning new 
types of intermediate goods is costlessly and instantaneously transferable 
between countries. The externality associated with the creation of this new 
knowledge is also global. However, the technologies for producing
intermediate and final goods are not identical. The concept of comparative
advantage therefore has meaning in their model. In their other work dealing
with two-country endogenous growth there also is assumed to be a difference 
between the technologies for producing new knowledge. Knowledge transfer is 
non-instantaneous and sometimes costly. See Grossman and Helpman [1989a, b, c 
and d]. Feenstra f1990] develops a two-country endogenous growth model in 
which there js no tinancial capital mobility or technology transfer. Quah and 
Rauch [1990] also consider trade in intermediate goods in an endogenous growth
model. Young [1989] considers a two-country endogenous growth model in which 
immobile labor is the only factor of production in both countries and in which 
there is no international borrowing and lending. Technologies differ 
initially between the two countries and will not necessarily converge, even 
asymptotically. 
Bllhat we say about convergence or divergence of national productivity 
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levels can apply to any sub~unit of the global economy. In most of 
international trade theory the label "nation" does double duty. It defines 
the set of agents under the political jurisdiction of a particular government 
(and thus subject to its taxes, regulations, tariffs etc); it is at the same 
time used to define the domain of mobility of certain economic agents, factors 
of production and their owners and -other inputs (e.g. cultural attitudes · 
towards lying, bribery, shirking, finking etc.). It is clear that the 
relevant domain of a particular agent, factor of production or cultural trait 
need not coincide with the political definition of the nation state. The 
relevant domain or region can be a subset of the national economy, can contain 
the national economy or can have an intersection with the national economy
that is non-empty but less that the union of the two. 
9\'hat we say about convergence or divergence of national productivity 
levels can apply to any sub-unit of the global economy. In most of 
international trade theory the label "nation" does double duty. It defines 
the set of agents under the political jurisdiction of a particular government 
(and thus subject to its taxes, regulations, tariffs etc); it is at the same 
time used to define the domain of mobility of certain economic agents, factors 
of production and their owners and other inputs (e.g. cultural attitudes 
towards lying, bribery, shirking, finking etc.). It is clear that the 
relevant domain of a particular agent, factor of production or cultural trait 
need not coincide with the political definition of the nation state. The 
relevant domain or region can be a subset of the national economy, can contain 
the national economy or can have an intersection with the national economy 
that is non-empty but less that the union of the two. 
tO\Je shall use the short-hand expression "decreasing returns to 
reproducible factors" to mean that the production function is homogeneous of 
degree less than unity in reproducible factors of production. 
11By models with constant returns to reproducible or augmentable inputs we 
mean those endogenous growth models that do not have scale effects entering 
into the determination of the equilibrium growth rate. Endogenous growth can 
of course be obtained in such models even without constant returns to the 
reproducible inputs. All that is required is that the Inada conditions be 
violated in such a way that the marginal product of reproducible inputs be 
bounded sufficiently far away from zero even when the ratio of reproducible to 
non-reproducible inputs increases without bound. The endogenous growth models 
we shall consider achieve this despite the Inada conditions being satisfied, 
by having constant returns to reproducible inputs at the level of the 
aggregate national production function. By models with decreasing returns to 
reproducible inputs we mean models for which the Inada conditions are 
satisfied and the production function is homogeneous of degree less than unity 
in reproducible inputs. The steady state growth rate of labor productivity 
(if a steady state exist) is exogenous and equal to the exogenous rate of 
labor-augmenting (or Harrod neutral) technical change. 
12Recent examples of studies that investigate national differences in per 
capita output levels and growth rates using as (one of) the technological · 
mainta.ined hypotheses the constant or decreasing returns to augmentable
factors of production model and the common global technology of production 
include the empirical studies of Barro [1989a,b], King and Rebelo [1989], 
Benhabib and Jovanovic [1989] and Cohen [1990]. For more on the facts on 
convergence see Baumol [1986] and Baumol, Blackman and \'olff [1987]. Easterly 
[1989] has a technology that can exhibit increasing returns to scale but 
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focuses on the case of constant returns to reproducible factors and either a 
constant value for the irreproducible factor or independence of output from 
the irreproducible factor in steady state. In Easterly [1990] the model is 
simplified to exhibit constant returns to reproducible factors. Irreproducible
factors play no role. Finally, Edwards [1989] develops and tests a simple model of 
growth in developing countries in which the assumption o{ access to a common global
technology is abandoned. It is replaced by one of gradual catching up by a 
technologically backward nation to the higher external level of technology. The rate 
at which a country catches up is postulated to be an increasing function of the 
.degree of external orientation in the country's international trade relations. 
Barro and Sala-i-Martin [1990] use a model without factor mobility to analyze 
convergence of growth rates among regions within a nation state (the states of the 
USA). They recognize that this framework is unrealistic for countries and especially
for the U.S. states and note that extensions of the neoclassical growth model that 
allow for features of an open economy tend to speed up the predicted rate of 
convergence. 
t3In a companion paper to the current one, '"'e consider a 
Yaari-Blanchard-Weil OLG model to study the same range of issues analyzed in 
this .paper. In that model, the current stock of human capital can be 
allocated to leisure, to current production or to further human capital
accumulation. See Buiter and Kletzer [19911. The closed economy yersion of 
an endogenous grol.'th model l.'ith the Yaari-Blanchard-Weil OLG structure is 
analyzed in Alogoskoufis and van der Ploeg [1990a,b].
As pointed out to us by Olivier Blanchard, dynamic inefficiency can never 
occur, regardless of the specification of the consumption side of the model,
'"hen there is a production function such as the one used in Alogoskoufis and 
van der Ploeg, in '"'hich aggregate output is linear in the aggregate physical
capital stock. When Y = AK, A> O, the marginal product of capital, MPK, is 
constant and equal to A, l.'hich is also the average product of capital. In a 
closed system, ouput per unit of capital is obviously never less than capital
formation per unit of capital, '"'hich equals ouput per unit of capital minus 
the sum of private and public consumption per unit of capital. A necessary 
condition for the occurrency of dynamic inefficiency is obviously that the 
marginal product of capital be able to fall belo'"' the average .Product. This 
is ruled out l.'hen output is linear in the physical capital stock. Note that A 
need not be constant for this argument to hold, but only independent of K. 
Let C denote aggregate private consumption and G aggregate public
consumption. Without loss of generality, capital consumption is ignored. It 
follo'"'s that, in a closed economy, since C, G ~ O, '"'e have 
Our specification of the production function has constant returns to the 
tw? reproducible factors (physical and human capital) _together but less than 
unitary returns to each of the two factors of production separately. The 
marginal product of each of the tl.'o factors of production is belo'"' its average
product and is endogenous. Dynamic inefficiency is therefore in principle
possible in our model. 
14If increasing returns are internal to the individual firm (that is if 
returns to scale are increasing in productive inputs that can be varied at the 
level of the individual firm) and if they are unbounded, then no competitive
equilibrium can exist. 
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t5In an interesting recent paper, Caballero and Lyons [1989] find limited 
evidence in US manufacturing industry of internal increasing returns (at the 
two-digit level), but strong evidence of external economies, that is economies 
external at the two-digit level but internal at the level of the US economy. 
16For a recent opposing view see Romer [1986]. 
17Jt should be noted that Romer' s "replication postulate" may not be 
universally accepted by physical scientists as "the most basic premise of our 
scientific reasoning". It has a distinct pre-Quantum Theory flavor. While 
economics is still pretty much Newtonian as a science (or even pre-Newtonian,
that is Keplerian as regards theory and pre-Tycho Brahean as regards empirical 
observation) one should be careful in one's assertions about what real 
scientists believe. 
A fundamental property of the quantum world is that one cannot, even in 
principle, measure precisely both the momentum and the position of a particle 
at the same time. It is often explained in physical terms, that the act of 
measuring the position of a particle disturbs its momentum and vice versa. 
One implication is what Einstein referred to as a "spooky action at a 
distance", a communication between two particles even when they are far apart, 
so that particle A can be disturbed by the measurement made on particle B. 
Einstein had trouble with this, as it seemed to mean that the communication 
traveled faster than light. However, it is consistent with the experimental 
evidence (the test of Bell's inequality). It also makes a hash of the 
replication postulate. 
18" An input in production is rival if its use by one person or firm 
precludes its use by another" (Romer [1990b]). A completely non-rival good is 
one whose use by one person or firm in no way precludes its use by another. A 
good can be partly rival or even super non-rival: its use by one firm or 
person may enhance its availability for use by others. The use of a certain 
class of objects as a medium of exchange and means of payment may have this 
feature: my willingness to accept payment in a certain potential medium of 
exchange increases when the currency is used more widely. Starrett [1988] 
contains a very clear discussion of the subject. 
t9Ve assume that 1 + rt+l - Ot+l - ~t+l and 1 + rt+2 - Ot+2 are positive. 
From our assumptions about the production technology (given below) it follows 
that r > 0. The restriction that gross after-tax rates of return be positive 
is therefore a restriction on permissible fiscal policy. 
20An example of such a function would be the following generalization of 
equation (14) 
a ( )1-a-6 6ec et mt+ gt gt 
,p( :-0' = 11--------- 0 ~a~ 1; 0 ~ 6 < 1; 1/ > 0 
ht ho 
t 
Note that this permits the marginal productivity of public spending on 
education to be greater than (6 > 0), equal to (6 = 0) or less than (6 < 0)
the marginal productivity of private spending on education. 
21Yhile with perfect international capital mobility a single government can 
achieve world-wide dynamic efficiency, both governments can choose (balanced 
or unbalanced-budget) intergenerational redistribution schemes using Jump-sum 
taxes and transfers to achieve this (Buiter and Kletzer [1990b]). 
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221n continu.ous time -rt = dlnilt = dlnhi - dlnf(kt) and 
* * *1 * 1 *1-rt= dlnilt = dlnht dlnf(kt). Therefore -rt - -rt= dlnht - dlnht . 
23The assumptions which have been made explicitly or implicitly,
that population growth rates and labor force participation rates are 
_exogenous, are of course not the strongest point of the paper. 
24Note that u will be a function of the parameters of the model. 
25Note that without intergenerational redistributive policy
1 2 -1 *1 *2 * -1 :(rt+ rt(l + rt+2 - ot+2) = Tt + Tt (1 + rt+2 - ot+2) = 0), the growth 
rate of home country output per worker exceeds that of the foreign country if 
and only if the home country discount factor P exceeds that of the foreign
* country P. · This is true in and out of steady state. 
26Ve assume that 1 + rt+l - Ot+l - ~t+l and 1 + rt+2 - Ot+2 are positive. 
From our assumptions about the production technology (given below) it follows 
that r > 0. The restriction that gross after-tax rates of return be positive
is therefore a restriction on permissible fiscal policy. 
27Clearly, one would have to take a disaggregated view of the matter and 
allow for heterogeneity within generations in the real world. Even if average
private spending on education is positive, there may be many induviduals 
spending nothing on education. 
2BThe conclusion that, with common values of Oand~ in the two countries, 
there would be convergence (in our model instantaneous equality) of 
productivity growth rates when a= 0 remains correct also if A= 1 (when the 
growth rate of per capita human capital is linear in m + g). 
29In the framework of this paper, any consequences of lump-sum financing of 
,say, increased home country public spending on education would affect 
domestic and foreign interest rates and wage rates equally. This would 
therefore not alter productivity growth differentials. 
30This result follows through also for the constant elasticity of marginal
utility case. 
aisee footnote 12 for a discussion of how certain other endogenous growth
models can never exhibit dynamic inefficiency. 
32An alternative definition of the net fiscal transfer to generation t 
would be . 
-[ri + r~(l + rt+2 - Ot+2)-l - gt(l + rt+l - Ot+l)]. llhen a< 1 (and the 
non-negativity constraint on private educational expenditures (mt~ 0) is not 
binding), the transfer of educational services to a member of generation t, 
gt, can be viewed as income-in-kind, but it will clearly not be a lump-sum 
transfer. 
